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It  is  often  assumed  that  academically  trained  scientists  have  a  strong  taste  for science  and  are willing
to  “pay”  for  the  ability  to openly  disclose  their  research  results.  However,  little  is  known  regarding  how
scientists  considering  jobs  in industrial  R&D  make  trade-offs  between  positions  that  allow  publishing  on
the  one  hand  and  positions  that  do  not  allow  publishing  but  offer  higher  pay  on  the  other.  Using  data
on  over  1900  science  and  engineering  PhD  candidates  about  to enter  the  job  market,  we ﬁnd  that  while
some  are  unwilling  to give  up publishing  at  virtually  any  price,  over  one  third  of  those  most  likely  to  seek
positions  in  industrial  research  are  willing  to forego  publishing  for  free. We  develop  a  simple  model  of  the
“price”  scientists  assign  to  publishing  in  ﬁrms  and explore  potential  sources  of heterogeneity  empirically.
We  ﬁnd  that  the  price  of  publishing  increases  with  individuals’  preferences  for various  beneﬁts  fromreferences
ompensating differentials
abor  markets
publishing  such  as  peer  recognition  and  contributing  to society,  but  it decreases  with  their  preference  for
money.  Scientists  who  believe  themselves  to  be  of  high  ability  and  who  train  at  top  tier  institutions  have
a  higher  price  of  publishing.  Yet,  they  are  more  expensive  to  hire  (not  less)  even  if publishing  is allowed.
We  discuss  implications  for  research  on  the  economics  of  science  and  on  compensating  differentials,  for
managers  seeking  to  attract  and  retain  academically  trained  personnel,  and  for  ﬁrms  considering  their
participation  in  open  science.
 201©
. Introduction
A large stream of innovation research rests on the notion that
cientists have a strong desire to participate in “open science” by
isclosing and disseminating their research results to the broader
cientiﬁc community. For example, early work has highlighted
otential conﬂicts between scientists’ taste for science and the
losed commercial logic of the private sector (Kornhauser, 1962;
iller, 1967; Ritti, 1968). More recent research has suggested that
rms may  gain a range of beneﬁts from allowing their scientists
o participate in open science. In particular, ﬁrms adopting open
cience policies may  be better able to attract and retain academi-
ally trained scientists (Penin, 2007; Simeth and Raffo, 2013) and
hey may  even be able to extract a wage discount from scientists
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 404 385 4883.
E-mail addresses: henry.sauermann@scheller.gatech.edu (H. Sauermann),
ichael.roach@duke.edu (M.  Roach).
1 These authors contributed equally to this work.
048-7333     ©  2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.07.006
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND3 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
who  are willing to give up pay in exchange for opportunities to
engage in open science (Stern, 2004; Gans et al., 2010). Stern
(2004), for example, showed that R&D positions that offered a
science-oriented environment also offered lower wages, conclud-
ing that scientists “pay” to be scientists.2
By focusing on characteristics that appear to distinguish scien-
tists from other professionals – such as their taste for science –
most of the prior literature has implicitly treated scientists as a
homogenous group. Recent research, however, has challenged this
simplistic view by demonstrating signiﬁcant heterogeneity among
scientists (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001; Roach and Sauermann,
2010; Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013). We  contribute to this growing
stream of work by examining the degree to which scientists differ
in the price they assign to publishing opportunities in industrial
R&D and by exploring why some value publishing more than oth-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ers. Insights into these questions have important implications for
research on scientiﬁc labor markets, for managers seeking to attract
2 The notion of “open science” policies may  capture a wide range of aspects,
including  publishing, conference attendance, industry-academia collaborations, etc.
In this paper, we focus on publishing as a particularly salient aspect.
 license.
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nd retain highly educated employees, and for ﬁrms considering
he adoption of open science policies.
We conceptualize the price of publishing as the additional
mount of pay that a given scientist requires to make him indif-
erent between accepting an industrial R&D position that restricts
ublishing and one that allows it. Drawing on a survey of over 1900
cience and engineering PhD candidates preparing to enter the job
arket, we measure the price of publishing at the level of the indi-
idual by eliciting respondents’ reservation wages for hypothetical
ndustrial R&D positions that differ only with respect to whether or
ot they allow publishing. This approach enables us to characterize
he full distribution of the price of publishing in a given cohort of
hDs across a broad range of ﬁelds. As such, we  complement prior
ork that has focused on average equilibrium compensating dif-
erentials emerging in the labor market or that has used smaller
nd narrower samples (Stern, 2004; Stuart and Liu, 2010).3 The
urvey instrument also provides a rich set of measures that allow
s to explicitly examine which particular scientists place a higher
alue on publishing than others. As such, we expand upon prior
ork that has demonstrated heterogeneity across scientists and
as discussed its implications, but remains largely silent as to the
nderlying sources of this heterogeneity (Roach and Sauermann,
010; Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013). Perhaps most interestingly,
he data allow us to examine the reasons why scientists value the
pportunity to publish, complementing prior conceptual discuss-
ons of the different functions of publishing in the institution of
cience with unique empirical insights from scientists’ perspective.
While some PhDs conform to the stereotype and place a high
alue on the opportunity to publish when working in industrial
&D, we observe considerable heterogeneity in the price of pub-
ishing, with many scientists willing to forego publishing “for free”.
oreover, we ﬁnd that the price assigned to publishing opportu-
ities in ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly lower for those scientists who  aspire
o positions in industry than for those who would prefer to work
n academia. Indeed, a full 37% of those who prefer an industry
osition price publishing at zero, compared to 12% among those
ho prefer academic employment. As such, those scientists most
ikely to enter the private sector appear to place a lower value on
ublishing than the typical scientist portrayed in prior work.
To  gain a deeper understanding of which scientists value pub-
ishing more than others, we relate the price of publishing to
cientists’ preferences for various indirect payoffs from publishing
uggested in the prior literature. As predicted, we  ﬁnd that the price
f publishing is signiﬁcantly higher for those scientists with strong
references for peer recognition or for contributing to the stock of
ublic knowledge. In contrast, the relationship between the price
f publishing and scientists’ desire for career advancement is weak,
ossibly suggesting that publications are not seen as a key mecha-
ism for career advancement in industrial R&D. Most interestingly,
e also ﬁnd that the price of publishing is signiﬁcantly lower forhose individuals who care strongly about money, likely reﬂecting
hat these individuals derive more utility from a given amount of
oney and need only a small amount of extra pay to compensate
3 The term “compensating differential” is used widely in the labor economics and
uman capital literatures to describe the additional amount of money a job pays
o offset the absence of a desirable attribute (e.g., publishing) or the presence of an
ndesirable attribute (e.g., hazardous work conditions) (e.g., Rosen, 1986; Hwang
t al., 1992). In prior empirical work, the compensating differential is an equilibrium
utcome  in the labor market, i.e., it reﬂects both the supply and the demand side of
he labor market. Our focus is on the price each individual scientist assigns to the
pportunity to publish, i.e., on the supply side. While compensating differentials
bserved  in the labor market reﬂect the preferences of the marginal individual and
rovide limited insights into the preferences of the broader population (Rosen, 1986;
illingsworth, 1987; Aghion et al., 2008), our approach allows us to characterize the
istribution of preferences in a cohort of scientists.ch Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47 33
for the lack of publishing opportunities. Examining the relationship
between the price of publishing and proxies of ability, we ﬁnd that
scientists with higher self-perceived ability and those from top tier
institutions have a higher price of publishing. However, they also
expect higher wages irrespective of the publishing regime. As such,
they are more expensive to hire than other scientists when they are
allowed to publish, and they are disproportionally more expensive
when publishing is restricted. Finally, we also observe signiﬁcant
differences in the price of publishing across ﬁelds of science and
engineering, likely reﬂecting that publications are more important
as a mechanism to disclose research results and as a measure of
scientists’ performance in some ﬁelds than in others.
While only a ﬁrst step toward understanding the extent and pos-
sible sources of heterogeneity among scientists, our results speak
to the generalizability of common models of scientists’ preferences
and provide a foundation for future research to better understand
scientists’ behaviors and choices. Our ﬁndings can also have impor-
tant implications for science and technology-based ﬁrms that seek
to attract and retain highly educated employees or that consider
the adoption of open science policies for various reasons. Finally,
by providing deeper insights into how scientists make trade-offs
between publishing and pay, this study has implications for the
broader human capital literature that examines compensating dif-
ferentials and trade-offs between other types of job attributes such
as pay and social responsibility (Goddeeris, 1988; Auger et al.,
2011), pay and freedom (Aghion et al., 2008), or pay and a desirable
work location (Campbell et al., 2012).
In the following section, we provide background on the role of
publishing in the scientiﬁc system and conceptualize publications
as a means toward different ends, implying that scientists may
value publishing for a variety of reasons. In Section 3, we describe
the data and provide descriptive insights into heterogeneity in the
price of publishing and in the reasons for publishing. In Section 4,
we build on these insights to develop a model that relates the price
of publishing to individual characteristics such as preferences for
different potential payoffs from publishing as well as ability. This
model guides a more systematic regression analysis of the price
of publishing in Section 5. Section 6 discusses implications and
opportunities for future research.
2. Background
2.1. The institution of science and publications as a means
toward different ends
According  to the canonical view, the institution of science entails
as one of its key elements a reward system that encourages sci-
entists to quickly disclose new knowledge through publication
(Merton, 1973; Dasgupta and David, 1994). This system has advan-
tages to the extent that research results have characteristics of
a public good, leading to sub-optimal incentives for research in
a traditional market system (Stephan, 2012). Moreover, research
ﬁndings can provide valuable inputs for follow-on research, sug-
gesting that the open disclosure of knowledge may  beneﬁt society
by allowing researchers to build on existing knowledge in a cumula-
tive fashion (Nelson, 2004; Sorenson and Fleming, 2004). Thus, the
publication-based reward system of science has been interpreted
as an institutional mechanism designed to encourage both the pro-
duction and the diffusion of new knowledge (Stephan, 2012).
Individual  scientists, however, may  not care directly about pub-
lishing per se, but rather about the various indirect beneﬁts that can
result from publishing one’s research. While we cannot consider all
possible types of such beneﬁts, several have been prominently fea-
tured in prior work. First, publications are often used as a measure
of scientists’ research ability or performance and as a predictor of
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To obtain a sampling frame, we identiﬁed U.S. research universi-
ties with large doctoral programs in science and engineering ﬁelds4 H.  Sauermann, M. Roach / R
uture contributions to science.4 As such, scientists with a larger
ublication record have a higher value in the scientiﬁc labor market,
llowing them to obtain positions that offer higher pay (Tuckman
nd Leahey, 1975; Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990; Stuart and Liu, 2010)
ut also higher levels of non-pecuniary job attributes such as
esearch freedom or resources for research (Latour and Woolgar,
979; Stephan, 2012). Therefore, giving up current pay in order
o build a stock of publications may  be seen as an investment into
uture job opportunities and higher pay (see Rosen, 1986; Levin and
tephan, 1991; Franco and Filson, 2006). When asked in an open
nded question why he would value publishing opportunities in
ndustrial R&D, for example, one of our respondents stated: “Pub-
ishing builds a base where you can get better (i.e. higher-paying)
obs later. Less money now for the chance to make more later.”
Other  scholars have emphasized peer recognition or “kudos” as
nother payoff from publishing (Merton, 1973; Gans et al., 2010).
hile recognition may  in turn result in better jobs or higher pay,
cientists may  also derive utility from recognition itself.5 Indeed,
rior work in innovation as well as other domains suggests that
ndividuals care strongly about recognition and may  “pay” for vis-
ble signs of recognition such as the introduction into clubs of best
mployees (Maslow, 1943; Von Krogh et al., 2012; Larkin, 2013).
inally, apart from the extrinsic rewards provided by the scientiﬁc
ommunity, scientists may  value the open dissemination of knowl-
dge through publications because it allows them to have a greater
mpact on the advancement of science (Merton, 1973; Dasgupta
nd David, 1994; Sorenson and Fleming, 2004). In a related vein,
ans and Stern (2010) argue that many scientists subscribe to
orms of openness and may  feel a “repugnance” toward attempts
o limit access to knowledge for private beneﬁt or proﬁt. To quote
ne of our respondents, “Knowledge belongs to everyone, and the
rowth of scientiﬁc knowledge cannot occur if it is hoarded for
oney and collaboration and conversation is discouraged.”
While this discussion suggests that publications can provide
everal indirect payoffs, little is known regarding the reasons for
ublishing from the scientists’ perspective, and whether different
easons for publishing are tied to differences in the price scien-
ists assign to publishing opportunities in industrial employment.
efore we examine these questions, however, we discuss why
cientists considering positions in industry may  face a trade-off
etween publishing and pay in the ﬁrst place.
.2. Trade-offs between publishing and pay in industrial R&D
The canonical view of the institution of science sketched out
bove is based primarily on studies of academic science. However,
cientiﬁc labor markets straddle academic and industrial science,
nd publications also play important roles in industry (Hicks,
995; Stern, 2004; Sauermann and Stephan, 2013). In particular,
any ﬁrms look at scientists’ publication record as an indicator of
esearch ability and success, resulting in a higher labor market value
or industrial scientists who publish proliﬁcally (see Cockburn and
enderson, 1998; Stuart and Liu, 2010). Similarly, even when pro-
uced in the context of industrial R&D, publications may  allow
esearchers to gain peer recognition and to contribute to the stock
f public knowledge. As such, it is typically assumed that even sci-
ntists working in industry value the opportunity to publish and
4 At the same time, the limitations of publications as a measure of performance
r  contribution to science are well recognized (Merton, 1973; Rennie et al., 1997;
aeussler  and Sauermann, 2013).
5 For simplicity, we  conceptualize higher pay and career beneﬁts as resulting from
 successful publication record (rather than from peer recognition) and focus on the
onsumption value of recognition.ch Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47
to participate in the reward system of science (Stern, 2004; Penin,
2007; Simeth and Raffo, 2013).
Scientists’ preferences for publishing, however, may  conﬂict
with the goals of industrial employers, who  operate primarily in
a market-based system and who  often desire to restrict the disclo-
sure of new knowledge (Miller, 1967; Gans et al., 2010). Firms may
seek to limit disclosure for various reasons. First, open disclosure
reveals potentially valuable information to rivals and likely reduces
a ﬁrm’s ability to appropriate ﬁnancial returns from its knowledge.
As such, many ﬁrms consider secrecy the most effective mechanism
to protect knowledge assets in a wide range of industries (Cohen
et al., 2000).6 Disclosure may  also help competitors in their own
efforts to generate new knowledge by providing them with knowl-
edge inputs or a “map” for their search for new knowledge (see
Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). In many cases, the ﬁnancial returns
from private knowledge accrue primarily to employers rather than
scientists (IPO, 2004; Harhoff and Hoisl, 2007), such that the cost
of disclosure are borne mainly by employers, while the beneﬁts of
disclosure (e.g., peer recognition and labor market value) accrue
primarily to the individual scientists.
On the other hand, ﬁrms may  also see certain advantages
to  using a pro-publishing open science regime, including bet-
ter access to extramural knowledge (Cockburn and Henderson,
1998; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003), strategic beneﬁts when compet-
ing against rivals (Penin, 2007; Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky,
2012; Polidoro and Theeke, 2012), or improved coordination with
partners (Alexy et al., 2013). Despite these potential beneﬁts of
adopting open science policies, at least some ﬁrms are likely to put
restrictions on the disclosure of research results. As such, scientists
face trade-offs between jobs that offer publishing and jobs that limit
disclosure but pay a compensating wage differential (Stern, 2004).
We now provide ﬁrst descriptive insights into the price scientists
assign to publishing when faced with this trade-off and explore the
reasons why  they value the opportunity to publish.
3. Data and descriptive results
3.1. Data
We  use data from a national survey of PhD candidates at tier one
U.S. research universities. Using data from scientists prior to their
initial career transition rather than employed scientists has two
key advantages. First, the trade-offs between ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial job attributes such as pay and publishing are particularly
salient in the context of initial job and career choices (Stern, 2004;
Aghion et al., 2008; Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013), making scientists
facing such choices the most relevant sample to study these issues.
Moreover, since virtually all scientists go through extensive aca-
demic training, sampling individuals in training provides insights
into a large part of the distribution of scientists’ preferences in a
given cohort, avoiding potential selection biases associated with
samples of individuals who  have already entered particular career6 Appropriability concerns may be mitigated if knowledge is patented as well as
published (Gans et al., 2010). Even with patents as an additional protection mecha-
nism,  however, publication is likely to increase the threat of imitation since patents
are not very effective in most industries and secrecy is seen by many ﬁrms as more
effective than legal mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2000).
7 One may  be concerned that PhD candidates might not have much experience
with  publishing and thus ill-formed preferences regarding publishing policies. Mit-
igating this concern, we  ﬁnd that over 80% of our cases have at least one publication,
and  the mean number of publications is 2.46. Dropping those cases without a pub-
lication does not change our substantive results.
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willing to take a wage cut in return for publishing opportunities.
This result stands in stark contrast to the notion that all scien-
tists value publishing. At the same time, many scientists do valueH. Sauermann, M.  Roach / 
y consulting the National Science Foundation’s (2008) reports
n earned doctorates. We  selected a subset of 39 universities
ased primarily on program size while also ensuring variation in
rivate/public status and geographic region. We  pre-tested the
urvey in interviews with junior scientists similar to our target
opulation and collected responses in the spring of 2010, appro-
ching individuals in two ways. First, we collected roughly 30,000
ndividual names and email addresses from graduate student
istings provided on department websites. We  invited these indi-
iduals to participate in the survey using a four-contact strategy
one invitation, three reminders). Adjusting for 6.3% undeliverable
mails, the direct survey approach achieved a response rate of 30%.
hen individual contact information was not available, we emailed
hD program administrators with the request to forward a survey
ink to their graduate students, and our research assistants addi-
ionally called administrators on the telephone to encourage their
ooperation. Overall, 85% of our responses were obtained directly
rom respondents and 15% were obtained through administrators.8
For this study, we focus on 1927 PhD candidates who were on
he job market (i.e., looking for a full-time job or postdoc position)
n the year of the survey or were planning to be on the market
ithin the next year. These respondents are likely to have given
ore consideration to job and career choices than early-stage stu-
ents and are also the most relevant population in the context of
his study.9
.2. Heterogeneity in the price of publishing and reasons for
ublishing
We  deﬁne the price of publishing (PricePub) as the additional
mount of pay at which a given scientist is indifferent between
aking an industrial R&D position that restricts publishing and a
osition that allows it, holding all other job attributes constant.
lthough we  conceptualize PricePub as the wage premium a scien-
ist requires to forego publishing, it can also be interpreted as the
age discount a scientist is willing to accept if allowed to publish.10
o measure the price of publishing, we employ a contingent valu-
tion approach similar to approaches used in economics and the
areer choice literature (see Cable and Judge, 1994; Slaughter et al.,
006; Blumenschein et al., 2008). In particular, we asked respon-
ents:
“Assume that you are offered the following two jobs in an
stablished ﬁrm. The positions differ only with respect to your
pportunities to publish. What would be the minimum starting
ompensation for you to accept each position?
Job  1: Allowed to publish research results
Job 2: NOT allowed to publish research results”
Respondents indicated their reservation wage for each job using
 sliding scale measure with anchors ranging from $0 to $200k. The
verage reservation wage for a job that does not allow publishing
8 The particular way in which survey respondents are approached may  lead to
ample selection or biased responses. In our context, offering ﬁnancial incentives
ay  increase the likelihood that individuals with above-average preferences for pay
espond, while a survey without ﬁnancial incentives may  primarily attract respon-
ents with above-average non-pecuniary preferences (e.g., interest in research). We
andomly assigned respondents into different conditions with respect to incentives
ut  found no signiﬁcant differences with respect to the key variables used in this
tudy (for details, see Sauermann and Roach (2013)). To assess potential nonres-
onse bias, we also compared responses of early and late respondents (Rogelberg
nd  Stanton, 2007) but found no signiﬁcant differences. We  nevertheless include
ontrols  for survey mode and response time in all regressions.
9 The largest numbers of respondents in our sample are from U of Washington
5.9%),  U of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (5.2%), Purdue U. (5.1%), UC Davis (5%), MIT
4.9%), UC Berkeley (4.7%), Johns Hopkins (4.3%) and U of Wisconsin–Madison (4%).
10 Given that publishing tends to be the norm rather than the exception in many
elds  (Stern, 2004; Sauermann and Stephan, 2013), we frame our discussion pri-
arily in terms of a wage premium rather than a wage discount.Fig. 1. Cumulative distribution of PricePub%.
(W NoPub) is roughly $96k (median $92k), while the average
reservation wage for the job that allows publishing (W Pub) is
$78k (median $75k). For comparison, the median salary of recent
S&E doctorate recipients in industry was  $85k in 2008 (National
Science Board, 2012, Table 3–22). Thus, the reservation wages
reported by our respondents are in line with actual salary ﬁgures.
We  calculate the price of publishing as Pri-
cePub  = W NoPub − W Pub, which is positive when respondents
require additional pay to forego publishing, and zero when they
are indifferent between the two jobs.11 The average price of pub-
lishing is $18,300. In addition to the absolute measure of PricePub,
we also compute a relative measure that expresses PricePub as
a percentage of the reservation wage for the job with publishing
and thus adjusts for differences in general wage expectations:
PricePub% = (PricePub/W Pub)*100. Using this measure, the price
of publishing amounts to a 25% premium over the wage that allows
publishing for the average respondent.12
Fig. 1 plots the cumulative distribution of PricePub%, showing
the share of scientists who  value publishing at or below a certain
price.
Fig. 1 shows a high degree of heterogeneity across individuals.
Particularly notable is that a considerable share of respondents
(23.5%) value publishing at zero, i.e., they would not require a wage
premium to give up publishing, or, alternatively, they would not be11 We dropped from the sample 3.6% of respondents who indicated a negative
price  of publishing. Our analysis of open-ended responses suggests that some of
them thought that the permission to publish comes with pressure to publish. Other
respondents may  have interpreted the response scales in the opposite direction, i.e.,
they thought of the dollar ﬁgures as indicators of the value they assign to these jobs
rather than the wage they require to take the positions. While we are cautious to
interpret negative PricePub as valid, it could indicate that some scientists indeed
place  a negative value on publishing, perhaps because they see publishing as a bur-
den. Also, a small number of individuals indicated a W NoPub that was multiple
times  larger than W Pub, likely signaling that they were essentially unwilling to
take a job that does not allow publishing. To reduce the inﬂuence of such outliers
and  to facilitate graphical analysis, we dropped cases where W NoPub was more
than  three times as large as W Pub (0.1% of cases).
12 Our question frames opportunities for publishing as dichotomous, yet publish-
ing  policies in ﬁrms may span a continuum that involves intermediate levels of
openness such as the disclosure of some results but not others, disclosure with
a delay, or combinations of patenting and publishing (Hicks, 1995; Gittelman and
Kogut, 2003; Gans et al., 2010). Our interviews and the open-ended survey responses
do  not indicate that this framing was a problem for respondents. However, the
price  scientists assign to “partial” openness is likely to be lower than the price of
publishing measured in our study.
36 H.  Sauermann, M. Roach / Research Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47
Table 1
Functions of publishing.
Panel A Panel B
Extremely important
function  (score of 5)
Category 1 2 Most important function
(highest  score; incl. ties)
Category 3 4
Share  of
respondents
Mean
PricePub%
Share of
respondents
Mean
PricePub%
Recognition No 69% 22.87** Recognition No 46% 23.93 n.s.
Yes 31% 29.56 Yes 54% 25.81
Job No 56% 23.12** Job No 30% 25.67 n.s.
Yes 44% 27.30 Yes 70% 24.63
Contribution No 58% 20.09** Contribution No 29% 20.71**
Yes 42% 31.59 Yes 71% 26.67
Pay No 88% 25.12 n.s. Pay No 75% 26.33**
Yes 12% 23.72 Yes 25% 20.72
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** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
ublishing, with the median respondent having a price of publish-
ng equivalent to roughly 18% of the base wage. At the top end of
he distribution, a small number of PhDs assign a very high price to
ublishing, indicating a great reluctance to take a job that restricts
isclosure.
To gain insights into why scientists value publishing, we asked
To what extent are the following functions of publishing impor-
ant or unimportant to you personally?”13 Focusing on the often
iscussed  – but empirically largely unexplored – potential reasons
aised earlier, we asked respondents to rate the following functions
n a scale ranging from 1 (extremely unimportant) to 3 (neither
nimportant nor important) to 5 (extremely important):
“Publications  are a way to earn recognition from my  peers and
colleagues”  (Function recognition).
“Publications  will help me  to get and keep a good job” (Function
job).
“Publishing research results allows me  to contribute to the
advancement of knowledge” (Function contribution).
“Having publications will lead to higher pay in the future” (Func-
tion  pay).
Column 1 in Table 1 shows the share of respondents who rated
ach of these functions as “extremely important”. We  see that this
hare is highest for publications as a means to obtain a good job
44%), followed by publications as a means to contribute to public
nowledge (42%), gain peer recognition (31%), and to obtain higher
ay (12%).14 Column 2 shows the mean price of publishing for
ndividuals who rate a particular function as extremely important
ersus those who  do not. We  ﬁnd that for recognition, contribution,
nd job, those who rate this function as extremely important have
 signiﬁcantly higher price of publishing. For pay, the difference is
ot signiﬁcant. While this analysis suggests that the price of pub-
ishing may  depend on the reason why a scientist values publishing,
 limitation is that our measures of functions confound the reason
or publishing with the importance of publishing.
Column 3 provides insights into the relative importance of dif-
erent functions. In particular, we coded a set of dummy  variables
ndicating whether a particular function received the respondent’s
13 Note that this question did not refer to industry employment speciﬁcally but
as  included as part of a question block asking respondents about their current
esearch activities and work environment.
14 One may be concerned that the low importance of higher pay as a reason
or  publishing may reﬂect social desirability bias (Moorman and Podsakoff, 1992).
omewhat mitigating this concern, we ﬁnd in Section 5 below that respondents rate
alary very important as a job attribute in general, and indeed rate it signiﬁcantly
igher  than opportunities to gain peer recognition. Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test.
highest rating. Since functions were rated independently, we  allow
for ties, i.e., multiple functions can receive the highest rating from a
particular respondent. We  ﬁnd that 71% of respondents rated con-
tribution to the advancement of knowledge as the most important
function of publishing, compared to 70% for job, 54% for recogni-
tion, and 25% for pay. We  again compare the mean of the price of
publishing across groups (column 4). Those respondents who state
contribution to society as the most important function assign a sig-
niﬁcantly higher price to publishing in industry than those who do
not. Those who see publishing primarily as a means to obtain higher
pay in the future have a lower price of publishing than those who
do not.15
3.3. Potential sorting into industry vs. academia
Fig. 1 showed signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the price individuals
assign to the opportunity to publish in industry, including over 20%
of respondents who  value publishing at zero. This heterogeneity is
not only interesting in its own right, but it also implies the need
to consider potential sorting and selection effects. In particular,
theories of career choice and labor market sorting suggest that indi-
viduals will tend to sort into those organizational contexts that offer
matching job attributes or incentives, potentially resulting in quite
different populations of individuals in different organizational con-
texts (Rosen, 1986; Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013). In our context, the
most interesting question is whether those scientists who care little
about publishing are more likely to seek positions in industry than
those scientists who  care strongly about publishing. In that case, the
price of publishing among those scientists entering industry may
be much lower than in the overall population of scientists depicted
in Fig. 1 and ﬁrms may  face applicants who  assign a relatively low
value to the opportunity to publish.
To examine such potential sorting effects, we relate the price
of publishing to scientists’ career preferences. To obtain a mea-
sure for the latter, we  asked respondents: “Putting job availability
aside, how attractive do you personally ﬁnd each of the following
careers?” Respondents separately rated “University faculty with an
emphasis on research or development” and “Job in an established
ﬁrm with an emphasis on research or development” on scales ran-
ging from 1 (extremely unattractive) to 5 (extremely attractive).16
15 The latter result may  be counterintuitive; it reﬂects that individuals who  rate
higher future pay as the most important function of publishing generally seem to ﬁnd
publishing less important (Function pay has the lowest average rating). They also
express a stronger preference for money in general (see Section 5 for this measure),
which,  as we  will show below, implies a lower price of publishing.
16 While career preferences are likely to predict actual career transitions, not all
graduates  may  be able to ﬁnd jobs in the sector they most prefer. In particular,
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Fig. 2. Average PricePub% and share of respondents with PricePub% = 0 by career
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(3)
Further assuming that the jobs are the same except for publish-
ing and the wage premium, we set i1 = i2 and w1 = w2 to obtain:19reference.
e  use these measures to create three dummy  variables reﬂecting
he relative attractiveness of the two careers: Industry > Academia
37%), Industry = Academia (28%), and Industry < Academia (35%),
espectively. Fig. 2 shows the average PricePub% as well as the share
f individuals with a price of 0 for each of the three groups. We
bserve that scientists who prefer employment in academia assign
 relatively high price to publishing opportunities in industry (38%
f the base wage), and only a small share of cases has a price of zero.
n contrast, the average price of publishing is much lower for those
ho prefer industry employment (14% of the base wage) and a full
7% of cases value publishing at zero.17
Overall, the analyses in this exploratory section revealed signiﬁ-
ant heterogeneity in both the price of publishing and in the reasons
hy scientists value publishing. We  have also seen that this hetero-
eneity may  have important implications for sorting into industry.
iven these results, we now seek to gain a more systematic under-
tanding of potential sources of the observed heterogeneity in the
rice of publishing. In Section 4, we begin by developing a simple
odel that relates the price of publishing to a range of individ-
al characteristics such as preferences for indirect payoffs from
ublishing, preferences for money, as well as researcher ability. In
ection 5, we use this model to guide a series of regression analyses.
. Modeling heterogeneity in the price of publishing
Recall that we deﬁne the price of publishing as the additional
mount of pay at which a given scientist is indifferent between
aking an industrial R&D position that restricts publishing and one
hat allows it, holding all other job attributes constant. To model
otential determinants of the price of publishing, we  begin with basic linear utility function similar to that employed by Stern
n many ﬁelds of science, the number of PhDs seeking tenure track academic pos-
tions far outstrips the number of such positions actually available (Sauermann and
oach, 2012; Stephan, 2012). As such, even some of the individuals expressing strong
references for academic employment may  enter industry or other non-academic
areers.
17 Using a small sample of scientists, Roach and Sauermann (2010) provide earlier
vidence  of sorting based on publishing preferences by showing a positive correla-
ion  between the importance of publishing and the perceived attractiveness of an
cademic career. However, that study provides no insights into the price scientists
ssign to publishing opportunities or into potential sources of heterogeneity.ch Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47 37
(2004), which considers publishing itself as an argument. The utility
scientist i derives from job j can be written as:
Uij = ij + ˛iiPubj + iwj, (1)
where ˛i is scientist i’s preference for publishing, Pubj is the permis-
sion to publish in job j,  i is the scientist’s research ability, i is the
scientist’s preference for pay, and wj is the wage offered by job wj.
Consistent with prior literature (see Goddeeris, 1988; Hwang et al.,
1992; Stern, 2004), a stronger preference for a particular beneﬁt
increases the utility derived from a unit of that particular bene-
ﬁt. For example, a scientist with a stronger preference for pay, i,
derives a greater utility from an additional unit of money. In line
with Stern’s (2004) argument, a scientist with higher research abil-
ity,  i, will produce more and better publications if he is allowed to
publish and thus will derive greater utility from the permission to
publish. Finally, the term ij captures the utility derived by scientist
i in job j from job attributes other than pay or publishing.
Reﬂecting our earlier exploratory ﬁndings regarding the reasons
for publishing, we  now consider more explicitly that publica-
tions can serve as the means toward obtaining a range of indirect
beneﬁts such as peer recognition or career advancement. Distin-
guishing these different beneﬁts is important because scientists are
likely to differ in their preferences for them, potentially leading to
differences in the value they place on publishing. As such, Eq. (2)
replaces publishing with a (limited) number of indirect beneﬁts
that may  result from publishing:
Uij = ij + i(˛1iRecogj + ˛2iCareerj + ˛3iContrj + iPayj) + iwj,
(2)
where Recogj is the peer recognition expected from producing pub-
lications in job j, Careerj are non-pecuniary career beneﬁts expected
from publications, Contrj is the contribution to the advancement
of science expected from publications, and Payj is the (additional)
amount of money a scientist expects to appropriate in the labor
market due to having publications.18 If a job does not permit pub-
lishing, these indirect payoffs are zero. The parameters ˛1, ˛2,
and ˛3 reﬂect the scientist’s preferences for recognition, career
advancement, and contribution to science, respectively. Note that
Payj is weighted by the same preference for pay as the current wage,
i.e., current wage and (discounted) future pay are assumed to be
substitutes.
To derive a scientist’s price of publishing, we now determine the
wage premium, PricePubi, that is required to equate the utilities
from two jobs that differ only with respect to whether or not they
allow publishing. Assuming that job 1 does not offer publishing
(all indirect payoffs from publishing are zero) and job 2 does offer
publishing, PricePubi has to satisfy the following equation:
 + (w +PricePub ) =  + (˛ Recog +˛ Career +˛ Contr + Pay )+ w .18 At the time the scientist considers a job offer with the permission to publish, the
various  indirect payoffs from publishing lie in the future. As such, the terms included
in  Eq. (2) should be understood as discounted, expected payoffs. For example, Payj is
the discounted future ﬂow of money the scientist expects to obtain in the labor mar-
ket due to having publications (see Tuckman and Leahey, 1975; Stuart and Liu, 2010).
Similarly, while actual publication output depends on objective ability, expected
publication output will depend primarily on the scientist’s self-assessment of his
own ability. For simplicity, we abstract from differences in discount rates across
individuals  or across types of beneﬁts.
19 Our focus is on the pay differential required to make the scientist indifferent
between  two  positions that differ only with respect to publishing policies. As such,
we do not explicitly model the determinants of the base wage, wj, which may  include
a variety of factors such as labor market conditions as well as the scientist’s ability
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Table 2
Variable descriptions and summary statistics.
Variable Used in section Corresponds to
in  Eq. (4)
Description Scale Mean SD Min  Max
Dependent variables
W  Pub 3, 5 Minimum starting compensation to accept job with
publishing
Cont. 78.07 21.42 30 200
W  NoPub 3, 5 Minimum starting compensation to accept job without
publishing
Cont. 96.37 30.60 30 200
PricePub  3, 5 PricePub PricePub = W NoPub − W Pub Cont. 18.30 20.61 0 125
PricePub%  3, 5 PricePub% = (PricePub/W Pub) * 100 Cont. 24.94 28.95 0 200
Independent  variables
Function  recognition 3 Importance of functions of publishing: recognition
from peers and colleagues
5  pt. 4.02 0.91 1 5
Function  job 3 Importance of functions of publishing: getting and
keeping a good job
5  pt. 4.26 0.82 1 5
Function  contribution 3 Importance of functions of publishing: contribute to
advancement of knowledge
5  pt. 4.28 0.75 1 5
Function  pay 3 Importance of functions of publishing: higher pay in
the  future
5 pt. 3.40 1.00 1 5
Industry  < academia 3, 5 Attractiveness of career in established
ﬁrm < attractiveness of career in academia
Dummy  0.35 0 1
Industry  = academia 3, 5 Attractiveness of career in established
ﬁrm = attractiveness of career in academia
Dummy  0.28 0 1
Industry>academia 3, 5 Attractiveness of career in established
ﬁrm > attractiveness of career in academia
Dummy  0.37 0 1
Imp.  recognition 5 ˛1 When thinking about ideal job, how important is. . .:
recognition from research community
5 pt. 3.51 0.89 1 5
Imp.  career 5 ˛2 When thinking about ideal job, how important is. . .:
opportunities for career advancement
5  pt. 4.26 0.58 1 5
Imp.  contribution 5 ˛3 When thinking about ideal job, how important is. . .:
contributing to society
5  pt. 4.16 0.69 1 5
Imp.  pay 5  When thinking about ideal job, how important is. . .:
ﬁnancial income (e.g., salary, bonus)
5 pt. 3.97 0.71 1 5
Imp.  recognition high 5 ˛1 Imp. recognition > 4 Dummy 0.08 0 1
Imp.  career high 5 ˛2 Imp. career > 4 Dummy 0.33 0 1
Imp.  contribution high 5 ˛3 Imp. contribution > 4 Dummy 0.30 0 1
Imp.  salary high 5  Imp. salary > 4 Dummy 0.19 0 1
Abilityself  5  Self-assessed ability relative to peers Cont. 6.54 1.63 0 10
NRC  btm 5 PhD program NRC ranked below 50 Dummy 0.26 0 1
NRC  top 50 5 PhD program NRC ranked top 50–21 Dummy 0.44 0 1
NRC  top 20 5 PhD program NRC ranked top 20 Dummy 0.31 0 1
Control  variables
Life  sciences 5 Field of current PhD program: life sciences Dummy 0.38 0 1
Chemistry  5 Field of current PhD program: chemistry Dummy 0.11 0 1
Physics  5 Field of current PhD program: physics Dummy 0.12 0 1
Engineering  5 Field of current PhD program: engineering Dummy 0.28 0 1
Computer  sciences 5 Field of current PhD program: computer sciences Dummy 0.11 0 1
Job  avail. academia 5 Subjective availability of faculty positions in academia Cont. 40.89 26.00 0 100
Job  avail. industry 5 Subjective availability of R&D positions in established
ﬁrms
Cont. 61.76 23.29 0 100
Male  5 Gender: male Dummy 0.61 0 1
Age  5 Age Cont. 28.61 3.02 22 45
US  citizen 5 US citizenship status Dummy 0.70 0 1
Response  mode/time 5 Response mode (direct vs. through admin) and round
in  which response was  received
Dummies
P
a
a
r
n
(
c
iricePubi = i(˛1iRecog2 + ˛2iCareer2 + ˛3iContr2 + iPay2)/i.
(4)
Eq. (4) suggests that PricePub will increase with (self-assessed)
bility ( i) as well as preferences for peer recognition, career
dvancement, and contribution to science (˛1, ˛2, and ˛3). This
esult is intuitive – individuals who expect to generate a higher
umber of publications or who derive more utility from the indirect
Stern, 2004). This simpliﬁcation mirrors our empirical strategy to measure Pri-
ePub as the difference between two reservation wages (i.e., individual differences
n  overall wage expectations are subtracted out).beneﬁts resulting from a given publication will require a larger
amount of money to offset the utility loss due to publishing restric-
tions. Less intuitively, Eq. (4) also predicts a negative relationship
between the preference for pay, i, and PricePub, which reﬂects
two opposing effects of a stronger i. One the one hand, scientists
who care strongly about money derive greater utility from the
indirect ﬁnancial beneﬁts that publications can yield in the labor
market. On the other hand, scientists with a strong preference for
money also derive a greater utility from the wage premium paid
to compensate for the lack of publishing and, as such, a smaller
wage premium will be sufﬁcient to offset a given amount of utility
lost due to publishing restrictions. As per equation 4, the net effect
of these two mechanisms will generally be a negative relationship
between the preference for pay and the price of publishing (i.e.,
Research Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47 39
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PricePubi/ıi < 0).20 Note that Eq. (4) also suggests that the
rice of publishing should be higher in ﬁelds where publishing is
xpected to result in higher levels of indirect beneﬁts, e.g., where
ublications are more strongly tied to peer recognition (larger
ecog2) or career advancement (larger Career2).
Overall, this simple model provides a number of insights. First,
t predicts that the price of publishing will be higher for individuals
ho believe to be of higher ability. Second, the price of publishing
ill increase with scientists’ preferences for nonpecuniary payoffs
rom publishing, i.e., preferences for recognition, career advance-
ent, or contribution to science. Finally, the price of publishing
ill decrease with the importance a scientist assigns to money.21
e  now examine these relationships as well as other potential
ources of heterogeneity in the price of publishing in a regression
ramework.
. The price of publishing in a regression framework
.1. Variables
Our main dependent variable is the price of publishing (Pri-
ePub), the difference between a respondent’s reservation wage
or the position that does not allow publishing and the position
hat does. Section 3.2 above provides a detailed discussion of
his measure. In the following, we introduce additional variables.
escriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Tables 2 and 3.
.1.1. Preferences for pay and indirect beneﬁts from publishing
To  measure preferences for pay and potential indirect bene-
ts from publishing, we asked respondents: “When thinking about
n ideal job, how important is each of the following factors to
ou?” Respondents rated the items “Financial income (e.g., salary,
onus)”, “Contributing to society through my  research”, “Receiving
ecognition from the research community”, and “Opportunities for
areer advancement” on scales ranging from 1 (not at all important)
o 5 (extremely important). Note that this set of preference meas-
res is different from the measures of the functions of publishing
iscussed in Section 3. The measures used here capture general pre-
erences for various types of beneﬁts, regardless of publishing, and
ere included in a part of the survey focusing on job and career
hoices. As such, these measures correspond closely to the prefer-
nces in our theoretical model (Section 4) and, unlike the measures
sed in Section 3, do not confound different reasons for publishing
ith the importance assigned to publishing.
For auxiliary analyses, we also use dichotomized measures indi-
ating whether a respondent rated a particular beneﬁt “extremely
mportant” (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). These measures allow
or a more intuitive interpretation of estimates and are also more
obust to inter-personal differences in respondents’ interpretations
f intermediate values of the rating scale. Using the dichotomized
easures, Table 4 shows the mean PricePub and PricePub% for
espondents with high versus low preferences for the four beneﬁts.
s predicted, we ﬁnd that the price of publishing is signiﬁcantly
igher for those with stronger preferences for recognition and
20 Individuals with a strong preference for pay may  well ask for higher levels of
verall  wages. However, we  are not concerned with wage levels per se but with the
mount of money that creates the same utility as the opportunity to publish.
21 While our model builds on the Stern (2004) model, we  make some fundamental
hanges.  In particular, we  introduce different indirect payoffs from publishing as
ell as individual-level heterogeneity in scientists’ preferences. In Stern’s model,
references for a science oriented job environment were assumed to be the same for
ll individuals (see his FN 13) and preferences for pay were absent (i.e., also assumed
o  be homogenous). These changes allow us to derive the price of publishing at the
evel of each individual scientist, while Stern focuses on the wages and compensating
ifferentials  emerging in labor market equilibrium. Ta
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Table 4
PricePub and PricePub% across categories of independent variables.
Variable Category PricePub PricePub%
Imp. recognition Low 17.41** 24.05**
High 29.05 35.70
Imp. career Low 18.03 n.s. 25.25 n.s.
High 18.87 24.30
Imp. contribution Low 16.85** 23.01**
High 21.73 29.50
Imp. pay Low 19.62** 27.17**
High 12.65 15.37
Abilityself Btm 13.92** 19.00**
Top 50 17.47 24.37
Top 20 22.03 28.48
NRC ranking Btm 15.42** 22.11*
Top 50 18.93 26.19
Top 20 19.83 25.55
Note: Test of differences in the price of publishing across categories of preference
measures  using Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test. Joint tests of differences across cat-
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sgories of Abilityself/NRC ranking using OLS with robust standard errors.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
ontribution to society. This result is consistent with the model
eveloped in Section 4, suggesting that stronger preferences for
ndirect beneﬁts from publishing should increase the utility derived
rom the opportunity to publish, resulting in a larger price assigned
o publishing. Also as predicted, Table 4 shows that the price of pub-
ishing is lower for those individuals with a strong preference for
ay. Recall from Section 4 that individuals with strong preferences
or pay place a higher value on future ﬁnancial beneﬁts resulting
rom publications but they also place a high value on the wage pre-
ium paid in return for publishing restrictions; the net effect is a
egative relationship between the preference for pay and the wage
remium required to give up publishing.
.1.2. Self-assessed research ability and PhD program quality
Our  model suggests that PhDs’ assessment of their own ability
hould drive the price they assign to publishing when considering
ob options. To measure self-assessed ability, we  asked respon-
ents: “How would you rate your research ability relative to your
eers in your speciﬁc ﬁeld of study?” (Abilityself). The slider scale
anged from 0 (least skilled, lowest percentile) to 10 (most skilled,
ighest percentile). The average of Abilityself (6.54) is somewhat
igher than the mean of the scale (5), which could reﬂect higher
bjective ability in our sample of students at tier 1 research institu-
ions but may  also reﬂect overconﬁdence. Even if Abilityself partly
eﬂects overconﬁdence, however, we expect it to increase the price
f publishing (see Larkin et al., 2012). Table 3 shows a positive and
igniﬁcant correlation between PricePub and self-assessed ability
r = 0.13, p < 0.01). In Table 4, we trichotomize this measure and
eport the mean price of publishing for each category. As predicted,
e ﬁnd that PricePub is signiﬁcantly higher for individuals who
elieve themselves to be at the top of the ability distribution.
We  supplement self-assessed ability with an objective measure
f the quality of respondents’ PhD program, using the rankings
ublished by the National Research Council (2010). More specif-
cally, we use the ranking of a program’s “research activity”, which
eﬂects factors such as the average number of publications per fac-
lty, citations, as well as grants and awards.22 Using this measure,
e classiﬁed programs into three broad categories: NRC top 20
22 The NRC data as well as detailed descriptions of the data collection and rank-
ng  procedure are available at http://www.nap.edu/rdp/. NRC does not publish one
ingle research ranking for each program but a probabilistic range including a 5th
ercentile and a 95th percentile ranking. We  averaged the two rankings to obtain a
ingle measure.ch Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47
(ranking in the top 20), NRC top 50 (ranking between 21 and 50)
and NRC btm (ranking below 50). Abilityself and the NRC ranking
provide complementary insights. In particular, it is likely that PhDs
focus on a local reference group when making self-assessments
(see Greenberg et al., 2007) such that Abilityself may reﬂect pri-
marily perceived ability differences within a given PhD program
or within a smaller set of peer universities. In contrast, the NRC
ranking focuses on quality differences across the whole range of
programs and likely proxies for a broader set of factors such as
research activity, the quality of research training as well as other
department characteristics such as resources. The NRC ranking
is a particularly interesting complement to self-assessed ability
because program quality can be an important factor in the job mar-
ket and research intensive ﬁrms often have a strong interest in
hiring PhDs graduating from top programs (Stephan et al., 2005).
Table 4 shows that the price of publishing increases with program
quality, with particularly large differences between respondents in
programs in the top 50 or top 20 versus those in programs ranked
below 50.
5.1.3.  Control variables
Since  perceived labor market conditions may shape wage expec-
tations, we  asked respondents “What do you think is the probability
that a PhD in your ﬁeld can ﬁnd the following positions after
graduation (and any potential Post-docs)?” Respondents indicated
subjective probabilities for “University faculty with an emphasis
on research or development” and “Job in an established ﬁrm with
an emphasis on research or development”, respectively. We  also
control for respondents’ ﬁeld of study as well as demographic char-
acteristics including age, gender, and U.S. citizenship status. Finally,
we include a set of dummy  variables indicating whether a survey
response was  elicited indirectly via a departmental administrator
or, alternatively, after which of the four direct survey contacts a
response was  received (see Section 3.1).
5.2. Main regression results
Our featured regressions use the price of publishing (PricePub)
as the dependent variable and are estimated using OLS (Table 5).
We allow for heteroskedasticity and intraclass correlations by clus-
tering standard errors at the level of the university. Supplementary
analyses using PricePub% and different estimation techniques are
presented in Section 5.4.
Model 1 includes control variables and the measures of prefer-
ences. Consistent with the descriptive results in Table 4, we  ﬁnd
that the importance of recognition and of contribution to society
have positive relationships with the price of publishing. However,
we ﬁnd no effect of the preference for career advancement. Using
the model developed in Section 4 as our guide, a potential inter-
pretation of these results is that in the context of industrial R&D,
publications are seen primarily as a mechanism to gain peer recog-
nition and to contribute to the stock of public knowledge, but not
as an important mechanism to advance in one’s career. Reinforcing
our ﬁnding in Table 4, model 1 shows a strong negative relation-
ship between the preference for pay and the price assigned to
publishing. This result is consistent with the notion that strong pre-
ferences for pay increase the utility an individual derives from a
compensating wage premium, thus reducing the amount of money
required to offset the lack of publishing opportunities.23
23 The negative coefﬁcient of the preference for pay does not imply that ﬁnancial
beneﬁts  from having publications are absent. Such beneﬁts may  well be present,
and  individuals with a stronger preference for pay will derive a higher utility from
such beneﬁts. However, as shown in Section 4, preferences for pay also increase the
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Table  5
Price  assigned to publishing opportunities in industry.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub
Imp. recognition 6.432**
[0.511]
6.076**
[0.514]
4.242**
[0.458]
Imp.  career 0.714
[0.790]
0.477
[0.764]
1.374+
[0.773]
Imp.  contribution 1.755*
[0.694]
1.774*
[0.690]
1.752*
[0.691]
Imp.  pay −4.248**
[0.614]
−4.163**
[0.588]
−2.806**
[0.568]
Abilityself  1.494**
[0.214]
0.805**
[0.223]
0.587**
[0.211]
1.355**
[0.229]
0.910**
[0.222]
NRC  top 50 3.674**
[1.063]
3.619**
[0.998]
2.987**
[0.980]
3.405**
[1.044]
2.743**
[0.981]
NRC  top 20 6.713**
[1.266]
6.056**
[1.143]
4.870**
[1.086]
6.643**
[1.211]
5.018**
[1.085]
Industry  = academia −9.761**
[1.225]
−7.339**
[1.221]
−8.222**
[1.272]
Industry  > academia −15.921**
[1.154]
−11.230**
[1.207]
−13.677**
[1.238]
Imp.  recognition high 9.200**
[1.982]
5.344**
[1.834]
Imp.  career high 0.992
[0.931]
2.474*
[0.999]
Imp.  contribution high 3.874**
[1.256]
3.110*
[1.252]
Imp.  pay high −7.743**
[0.824]
−5.140**
[0.917]
Chemistry  −6.203**
[1.302]
−7.310**
[1.088]
−6.034**
[1.113]
−3.922**
[1.273]
−3.919**
[1.122]
−6.394**
[1.115]
−3.582**
[1.141]
Physics  −0.201
[1.797]
0.588
[1.790]
0.574
[1.679]
−0.848
[1.808]
0.436
[1.668]
1.337
[1.781]
0.838
[1.717]
Engineering −4.288**
[1.031]
−5.392**
[0.942]
−5.020**
[0.868]
−2.271*
[1.091]
−3.225**
[0.886]
−4.955**
[0.922]
−2.779**
[0.904]
Computer  sciences 0.562
[1.972]
0.126
[2.047]
0.038
[1.827]
1.868
[2.193]
1.437
[1.857]
0.344
[2.017]
1.767
[2.016]
Job avail. academia −0.004
[0.018]
0.008
[0.019]
0.001
[0.019]
0.001
[0.018]
−0.002
[0.019]
0.006
[0.019]
0.001
[0.019]
Job avail. industry 0.005
[0.021]
−0.004
[0.022]
−0.005
[0.021]
0.017
[0.022]
0.001
[0.021]
−0.012
[0.021]
−0.003
[0.021]
Male 1.051
[0.941]
−0.013
[1.030]
0.710
[0.981]
−0.265
[1.052]
0.176
[1.059]
0.585
[1.027]
−0.040
[1.075]
Age 0.135
[0.151]
0.270+
[0.155]
0.223
[0.143]
0.073
[0.152]
0.158
[0.139]
0.252+
[0.146]
0.167
[0.139]
US citizen −0.233
[1.435]
−2.991*
[1.337]
−0.480
[1.404]
−2.741*
[1.218]
−0.916
[1.307]
−2.381
[1.442]
−2.212+
[1.311]
Response  mode/time Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Constant  −2.366
[5.373]
−1.435
[4.703]
−10.782*
[5.099]
24.627**
[4.733]
−3.48
[4.649]
−0.749
[4.575]
11.765*
[4.587]
Observations  1927 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927
R-squared  0.134 0.060 0.148 0.137 0.190 0.102 0.169
df  17 16 20 15 22 20 22
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at the level of the university in brackets.
Omitted categories: NRC btm, industry < academia, life sciences.
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* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Model 2 shows that the price of publishing increases with
cientists’ self-assessed ability and with the quality of the PhD
rogram. More concretely, a one-point increase in Abilityself (e.g.,
rom top 30% to top 20% in the subjective ability distribution)
ncreases the price of publishing by roughly $1500. Individuals in
tility derived from a compensating wage premium paid in return for publishing
estrictions,  with a negative net effect on the price of publishing.a top-20 program have a roughly $6700 higher price of publishing
than those in a program ranked below 50.24
Model 4 examines whether the price of publishing is related
to career preferences. Consistent with Fig. 2 (Section 3.3), we ﬁnd
that individuals who prefer industry employment assign a signif-
icantly lower price to publishing in ﬁrms than those who  prefer
24 In addition to a larger wage premium to forego publishing, high ability individ-
uals  may  also require higher base wages; we  will examine this possibility in Section
5.3.
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 career in academia. This result may  reﬂect that individuals with
trong preferences for money and weak preferences for publishing
eek to self-select into industrial R&D, which tends to offer higher
ay but also offers less openness (see Roach and Sauermann, 2010;
garwal and Ohyama, 2013). At the same time, this ﬁnding may
eﬂect that individuals who want to work in academia assign a
igher value to publishing in ﬁrms because publications might give
hem the option to return to academia.25 Either way, the key insight
s that those individuals who are most likely to seek industrial R&D
ositions tend to have the lowest price of publishing.
Model 5 includes all measures jointly. The coefﬁcients of the
bility measures remain highly signiﬁcant but are somewhat
maller than in the baseline, largely reﬂecting that ability is
orrelated with career preferences, i.e., individuals with higher
bilityself and those in top ranked programs are more likely to
xpress strong preferences for an academic career path. We  also
nd that the preference for career advancement is now marginally
igniﬁcant and positive.
In  models 6 and 7, we use the dichotomized measures of pre-
erences instead of the original ratings. The qualitative results are
nchanged, except that the preference for career advancement now
lso has a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient. More speciﬁcally, respon-
ents who ﬁnd career advancement extremely important have a
2474 higher price of publishing than those who do not.
Table  5 also shows interesting ﬁeld differences in the price
f publishing. In particular, we ﬁnd that the price of publish-
ng is signiﬁcantly higher in the life sciences (omitted category)
han in chemistry and engineering.26 These ﬁeld differences may
eﬂect otherwise unobserved differences in the indirect payoffs
espondents expect from publishing, i.e., that publications are more
mportant as a mechanism to disclose research results or as a mea-
ure of scientists’ performance in some ﬁelds than in others (see our
iscussion of Eq. (4) in Section 4). While we can only speculate at
his point, one potential driver of such ﬁeld differences is that more
applied” ﬁelds such as engineering or chemistry may  rely not only
n publications but also on patents or even physical artifacts to
isclose or embody research results (Allen, 1977; Sauermann and
tephan, 2013). Similarly, this ﬁnding may  reﬂect that labor mar-
ets are more competitive in the life sciences than in other ﬁelds,
ncreasing the importance of establishing a publication record as
n indicator of research ability (see Freeman et al., 2001; Stephan,
012).27
.3. Reservation wagesRecall that PricePub is the difference between W NoPub and
 Pub. To examine how independent variables affect the price of
ublishing via the former versus the latter, we now analyze the
25 In the words of one of our respondents: “Publishing could be seen as a form of
ompensation.  If I ever wanted to leave that company, I would have a publication
ecord  as proof of my accomplishments if I wanted to start at another company, or
ttempt to get back into academia.”
26 Our results are based on a PhD sample and do not necessarily generalize to sci-
ntists  or engineers across all degree types. Pursuing a PhD is more common among
ife scientists than among engineers (National Science Board, 2012), suggesting that
he engineers in our sample may  be more selected with respect to ability or aca-
emic  orientation than the life scientists. As such, the differences in the price of
ublishing may  be even larger between the “average” life scientist and the “aver-
ge”  engineer. While ﬁeld differences are not the focus of this paper, our results
omplement  prior work on differences in the motives and innovative activities of
cientists versus engineers (Ritti, 1968; Allen, 1977; Gruber et al., 2013).
27 In unreported analyses, we explored whether there are ﬁeld differences in the
elationships between PricePub and featured independent variables by estimating
ey  regressions separately for our largest ﬁelds, the life sciences and engineering.
he  results are similar to those using the pooled sample and we  ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
ifferences  across ﬁelds.ch Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47
two  reservation wages separately. We  estimate these models using
multivariate regression, i.e., two OLS regressions are estimated
simultaneously and the error terms are allowed to have nonzero
correlations (Table 6).
Model  1 includes the preferences for money and indirect ben-
eﬁts from publishing. The preference for career advancement has
a positive relationship with both wages. While the coefﬁcient is
somewhat larger in the regression of W NoPub, the difference is
not statistically signiﬁcant, consistent with the observation that
the preference for career advancement had only a marginally sig-
niﬁcant effect on PricePub in Table 5. In contrast, the coefﬁcient
of the preference for recognition is much larger in the regression
of W NoPub than in the regression of W Pub (F (1,1909) = 140.64,
p < 0.01), consistent with a large positive coefﬁcient in our featured
regressions of PricePub. The preference for pay has a positive rela-
tionship with W Pub, suggesting that individuals who care strongly
about money generally ask for higher base levels of salary. However,
the preference for pay has a negative relationship with W NoPub,
which likely reﬂects two offsetting effects: individuals with a strong
preference for pay generally desire higher salaries but also require
a smaller wage premium to offset the lack of publishing since a
stronger preference for pay increases the utility gained from a given
wage premium.
Model 2 shows that PhDs with higher self-assessed ability and
those from top tier programs expect higher levels of wages regard-
less of the publishing regime. However, the coefﬁcients are larger
in the regressions of W NoPub than of W Pub (F(3,1910) = 17.39,
p < 0.01). As a result, the reservation wage for the job with-
out publishing increases faster with ability/program quality than
the reservation wage for the job with publishing, resulting in
a positive net effect of these measures on the price of pub-
lishing. Thus, high ability scientists are likely to be generally
more “expensive” to hire than lower ability scientists, even if
they are allowed to publish, and this premium is further ampli-
ﬁed in jobs that do not allow publishing. Finally, model 3 also
includes the measures of career preferences. Individuals who  pre-
fer academia to industry ask for similar wages when publishing is
allowed28 but ask for signiﬁcantly higher wages when publishing is
restricted.
5.4. Supplementary analyses and robustness checks
Table 7 reports a series of supplementary analyses and robust-
ness checks. In models 1 and 2, we  use PricePub% (the price of
publishing as a percentage of W Pub) rather than the absolute
PricePub measure. The results regarding the measures of prefer-
ences are very similar to the featured regressions. Abilityself and
PhD program quality also continue to have signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcients. However, these coefﬁcients are somewhat weaker
than in the baseline models. This observation likely reﬂects that
high ability individuals generally ask for higher wages (see Section
5.3) and that a given absolute PricePub represents a smaller share
of the base wage for them. Interestingly, the PricePub% regressions
also show a negative coefﬁcient for computer scientists, i.e., their
price of publishing is lower than that of life scientists in relative
terms but not in absolute terms (we saw no effect in Table 5),
likely due to signiﬁcantly higher overall wage expectations among
computer scientists (see Table 6).
28 One might expect that individuals who prefer academic employment ask for
higher  wages to work in a sector that they ﬁnd less desirable (industry). While our
regressions suggest that individuals with a preference for academia do not ask for
higher pay in industrial R&D compared to those aspiring to industry employment,
they  do ask for more pay than what they are likely to receive when employed in
academia since salaries are generally lower in academia than in industry (Agarwal
and  Ohyama, 2013; Sauermann and Stephan, 2013).
H. Sauermann, M.  Roach / Research Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47 43
Table  6
Reservation wages.
1 2 3
a b a b a b
W  Pub W NoPub W Pub W NoPub W Pub W NoPub
Imp. recognition 1.683**
[0.541]
8.115**
[0.792]
1.187*
[0.580]
5.429**
[0.834]
Imp.  career 2.810**
[0.859]
3.524**
[1.256]
2.236*
[0.868]
3.611**
[1.247]
Imp.  contribution −0.004
[0.680]
1.750+
[0.995]
0.018
[0.675]
1.770+
[0.969]
Imp.  pay 2.185**
[0.679]
−2.063*
[0.992]
2.196**
[0.687]
−0.610
[0.987]
Abilityself  1.627**
[0.277]
3.121**
[0.410]
1.249**
[0.287]
1.836**
[0.413]
NRC  top 50 0.601
[1.124]
4.276*
[1.666]
1.012
[1.119]
3.999*
[1.608]
NRC  top 20 5.227**
[1.230]
11.940**
[1.823]
5.470**
[1.229]
10.340**
[1.766]
Industry  = academia −0.874
[1.144]
−8.213**
[1.644]
Industry  > academia 0.321
[1.173]
−10.908**
[1.686]
Chemistry  5.193**
[1.517]
−1.011
[2.218]
5.344**
[1.523]
−1.966
[2.259]
4.916**
[1.533]
0.997
[2.203]
Physics  2.228
[1.517]
2.027
[2.219]
2.149
[1.519]
2.737
[2.253]
2.869+
[1.515]
3.305
[2.178]
Engineering 12.971**
[1.234]
8.683**
[1.804]
12.466**
[1.261]
7.075**
[1.870]
12.279**
[1.268]
9.055**
[1.822]
Computer  sciences 19.376**
[1.632]
19.938**
[2.387]
19.378**
[1.646]
19.504**
[2.441]
19.627**
[1.648]
21.064**
[2.368]
Job  avail. academia −0.017
[0.018]
−0.021
[0.026]
−0.008
[0.018]
0.000
[0.027]
−0.014
[0.018]
−0.015
[0.026]
Job  avail. industry 0.117**
[0.021]
0.122**
[0.031]
0.109**
[0.021]
0.105**
[0.031]
0.106**
[0.021]
0.107**
[0.030]
Male  3.346**
[0.976]
4.397**
[1.427]
2.607**
[0.976]
2.594+
[1.447]
2.810**
[0.976]
2.985*
[1.402]
Age  0.135
[0.151]
0.269
[0.221]
0.210
[0.151]
0.481*
[0.224]
0.238
[0.151]
0.396+
[0.216]
US  citizen −1.046
[1.057]
−1.280
[1.546]
−1.950+
[1.024]
−4.941**
[1.519]
−1.192
[1.061]
−2.107
[1.525]
Response mode/time Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Constant  34.228**
[6.470]
31.862**
[9.461]
47.341**
[5.371]
45.906**
[7.964]
26.371**
[6.656]
22.891*
[9.564]
Observations  1927 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927
R-squared  0.201 0.163 0.204 0.142 0.219 0.21
Parameters  18 17 23
Correlation residuals 0.73 0.71 0.73
Note: Columns “a” regress the reservation wage for the job with publishing and columns “b” regress the reservation wage for the job without publishing. All models are
estimated using multivariate regression. Standard errors in brackets.
Omitted  categories: NRC btm, industry < academia, life sciences.
+ Signiﬁcant at 10%
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larger among those who  prefer academic employment. However,
none of these differences in coefﬁcients between subsamples are
statistically signiﬁcant.29
29 Not all respondents will eventually work in industrial or academic research,
and  individuals who seek to enter other careers – such as in consulting, teaching, or
government research – may  have a particularly low price of publishing in ﬁrms. In aSigniﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
In models 3 and 4, we use quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson as
n alternative estimation technique, which is consistent for integer
nd continuous non-negative outcomes, so long as the conditional
ean is correctly speciﬁed (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The
esults are robust.
Our  featured regressions showed that the price of publishing
iffers signiﬁcantly between those who prefer a research career
n industry and those who prefer a research career in academia.
n Models 5–10, we examine whether there are also differences in
he relationships between the price of publishing and independent
ariables by estimating models separately for those who prefer a
areer in academia and those who prefer a career in industry or
re indifferent. We  ﬁnd that the preference for pay has a some-
hat smaller negative effect among those aspiring to a career in
ndustry, perhaps indicating that these individuals expect higherﬁnancial payoffs from publishing in industry. The measures of
ability and program quality have a positive association with the
price of publishing in both samples but the coefﬁcients tend to berobustness check, we  restricted the sample to those individuals who rated research
in  industry or academia among their most attractive careers, dropping 21.7% of cases
who found some other career more attractive. Dropping these cases leads to only
small changes in the overall distribution of PricePub, which now has a mean of
$19.1k, with 21.7% of individuals stating a PricePub of zero (compared to $18.3k and
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Table 7
Supplementary analyses.
Full sample Industry < academia Industry ≥ academia
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OLS  OLS Poisson Poisson OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
PricePub%  PricePub% PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub PricePub
Imp. recognition 7.612**
[0.663]
5.052**
[0.575]
0.399**
[0.033]
0.285**
[0.030]
6.243**
[1.136]
5.391**
[1.300]
4.482**
[0.529]
4.485**
[0.549]
Imp.  career −0.377
[1.191]
0.877
[1.173]
−0.002
[0.044]
0.053
[0.046]
2.064
[1.927]
1.999
[1.808]
0.573
[0.676]
0.486
[0.655]
Imp. contribution 2.368*
[0.922]
2.337*
[0.907]
0.113**
[0.043]
0.110**
[0.041]
1.884
[1.635]
1.778
[1.535]
1.621**
[0.488]
1.684**
[0.494]
Imp.  pay −6.414**
[0.824]
−4.522**
[0.796]
−0.211**
[0.028]
−0.148**
[0.028]
−4.672**
[1.440]
−4.572**
[1.383]
−2.132**
[0.441]
−2.137**
[0.433]
Abilityself  0.769*
[0.315]
0.464
[0.293]
0.042**
[0.013]
0.031*
[0.013]
2.040**
[0.598]
1.416*
[0.622]
0.660**
[0.206]
0.189
[0.202]
NRC  top 50 4.910**
[1.798]
4.030*
[1.776]
0.200**
[0.063]
0.162**
[0.062]
5.260+
[2.608]
4.749+
[2.697]
1.661
[1.077]
2.243*
[0.964]
NRC  top 20 7.223**
[1.934]
5.569**
[1.840]
0.324**
[0.070]
0.255**
[0.066]
7.710*
[2.908]
6.780*
[3.037]
3.532**
[1.204]
4.002**
[1.097]
Industry  = academia −10.184**
[1.642]
−0.304**
[0.053]
Industry > academia −15.669**
[1.528]
−0.632**
[0.061]
Chemistry −10.219**
[1.483]
−7.265**
[1.477]
−0.360**
[0.081]
−0.244**
[0.077]
−5.383
[3.532]
−4.922
[3.542]
−5.059
[3.376]
−4.266**
[1.266]
−4.389**
[1.347]
−4.291**
[1.216]
Physics  −0.449
[2.550]
−0.640
[2.560]
0.043
[0.084]
0.029
[0.083]
−1.536
[3.251]
−1.078
[2.738]
−0.822
[3.032]
0.471
[2.023]
0.697
[2.214]
1.036
[2.000]
Engineering −10.527**
[1.347]
−8.026**
[1.356]
−0.255**
[0.049]
−0.162**
[0.049]
−3.359
[2.647]
−5.237*
[2.475]
−4.209+
[2.481]
−2.360+
[1.242]
−2.204
[1.394]
−3.079*
[1.364]
Computer  sciences −6.345**
[2.267]
−4.401+
[2.240]
−0.002
[0.087]
0.068
[0.089]
6.878
[4.485]
5.132
[4.422]
6.076
[4.399]
0.060
[1.786]
0.523
[2.112]
−0.543
[1.816]
Job  avail. academia 0.016
[0.026]
0.012
[0.026]
0.000
[0.001]
0.000
[0.001]
0.007
[0.041]
0.003
[0.044]
0.008
[0.044]
−0.011
[0.018]
0.003
[0.018]
−0.005
[0.018]
Job avail. industry −0.056+
[0.033]
−0.047
[0.033]
0.000
[0.001]
0.000
[0.001]
−0.042
[0.044]
−0.037
[0.041]
−0.052
[0.043]
0.038
[0.026]
0.033
[0.026]
0.031
[0.025]
Male −0.891
[1.213]
−1.636
[1.311]
0.028
[0.054]
0.003
[0.057]
−1.064
[1.888]
−2.590
[2.002]
−1.695
[1.957]
1.284
[1.112]
0.532
[1.127]
1.256
[1.147]
Age 0.316
[0.213]
0.225
[0.200]
0.012+
[0.007]
0.008
[0.007]
−0.144
[0.343]
−0.043
[0.329]
−0.016
[0.329]
0.248+
[0.142]
0.336*
[0.154]
0.290+
[0.145]
US  citizen −1.078
[1.703]
−1.682
[1.591]
−0.013
[0.073]
−0.039
[0.068]
−0.166
[2.753]
−2.403
[2.299]
−0.538
[2.713]
−1.279
[1.067]
−3.503**
[1.218]
−1.569
[1.100]
Response  mode/time Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Constant  3.04
[7.801]
13.215+
[7.154]
0.956**
[0.270]
1.384**
[0.248]
8.121
[11.864]
12.46
[10.176]
−4.952
[10.467]
−10.739*
[5.179]
−2.889
[5.084]
−14.394*
[5.394]
Observations  1927 1927 1927 1927 677 677 677 1250 1250 1250
R-squared  0.145 0.187 0.076 0.052 0.091 0.12 0.049 0.128
df  20 22 20 22 17 16 20 17 16 20
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets.
Omitted categories: NRC btm, industry < academia, life sciences.
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s+ Signiﬁcant at 10%
* Signiﬁcant at 5%
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Although not presented in Table 7, we also considered the possi-
ility that respondents may  associate different publishing policies
ith differences in other job attributes, such as intellectual freedom
r the nature of R&D, even though the reservation wage question
tated that the positions differ only with respect to opportuni-
ies to publish. Our analysis of open-ended responses suggests
hat only a very small number of individuals associated publish-
ng with other job attributes, and excluding these individuals from
he analysis does not change our results. However, this approach
s clearly limited and we  cannot rule out that some respondents
ssociated other “open science” characteristics with jobs that per-
it  publishing. To the extent that this is the case, PricePub should
3.5% for the full sample). Regression models using this smaller sample show very
imilar relationships as our featured models (available upon request).be interpreted as the price assigned not just to publishing but to an
open science atmosphere in a more general sense (see Stern, 2004).
6. Discussion
We  draw on survey data from over 1900 science and engineer-
ing PhD candidates to examine the price they assign to publishing
opportunities in industrial R&D. We  ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity
across individuals; while over 20% of PhDs are willing to give up
publishing “for free”, others would require a considerable wage pre-
mium to forego publishing opportunities. When asked why they
valued publishing, scientists expressed a range of different rea-
sons, suggesting that it is useful to conceptualize publishing as
a means toward different ends. In an effort to understand which
scientists place a higher value on publishing than others, we ﬁnd
that the price of publishing increases with scientists’ preferences
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R&D, our insights into PhDs’ reasons for publishing may  also be
useful in understanding the scientiﬁc community’s recent efforts to
foster open access publishing initiatives (Leptin, 2012).31 Similarly,
30 Not all ﬁrms seek to hire “star” researchers – some primarily need employees
with  a solid science background and a broader range of research and non-researchH. Sauermann, M.  Roach / 
or indirect beneﬁts from publishing such as peer recognition or
ontributing to the advance of science, but it decreases with their
reference for money. The price of publishing is higher for indi-
iduals who believe they have high research ability, and for those
raining at top tier departments, likely reﬂecting that these indi-
iduals expect to produce more publications if allowed to publish.
owever, even if allowed to publish, high ability scientists demand
igher wages than those of lower ability. Finally, scientists may  sort
ystematically based on their price of publishing; those scientists
ho assign the lowest value to publishing in ﬁrms are most likely
o seek positions in industrial R&D.
Our results should be seen in light of important limitations.
irst, we elicited the price of publishing by asking respondents to
tate reservation wages for hypothetical positions with different
ob attributes. Although similar hypothetical scenarios have been
sed in economics and the career choice literature (see Cable and
udge, 1994; Slaughter et al., 2006; Blumenschein et al., 2008), a
otential concern is that stated reservation wages may  not be reli-
ble indicators of the amount of money scientists would require
n a realistic salary negotiation. Somewhat mitigating this concern,
e showed in Section 3.2 that the stated reservation wages are
lose to actual starting salaries of science and engineering PhDs
n industry. A related concern is that scientists may  place a dif-
erent value on publishing in our study than they would when
hoosing among real jobs. While we have no comparison data from
eal settings (the price of publishing is typically unobserved at the
ndividual level), we do not expect a systematic bias due to the
ypothetical nature of our question. More importantly, since our
rimary interest is in the distribution of the price of publishing and
n potential sources of individual differences, potential biases that
nﬂuence all respondents in similar ways should not affect our key
esults.
Second, a concern with measures drawn from the same survey
nstrument is that relationships between variables may  be spurious
ue to common methods bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To mitigate
ommon methods bias, we used different question formats includ-
ng rating scales, slider scales, as well as open-ended questions. We
lso placed questions regarding dependent and independent vari-
bles on different pages of the survey questionnaire and separated
hem by unrelated questions. Moreover, our key dependent vari-
ble (PricePub) is a ﬁrst difference and any common methods bias
nherent in the reservation wage measures should be subtracted
ut. Common methods bias is not a concern regarding the NRC
anking since this measure was obtained from an independent data
ource.
Finally, our results are based on cross-sectional data and should
e interpreted as correlational rather than causal in nature. In par-
icular, while the results are consistent with a model in which
bility and preferences for various indirect payoffs from publish-
ng drive the price of publishing, they do not formally establish the
irection of causality. Even if interpreted as descriptive and correla-
ional in nature, however, our results have important implications,
o which we now turn.
Our  ﬁnding of a wide dispersion of the price of publishing across
ndividuals suggests that the “representative” scientist implicit in
uch of the prior literature is not necessarily a good represen-
ation of most contemporary scientists (see also Shapin, 2008).
s such, additional research is needed to understand the nature
nd sources of individual differences in scientists’ preferences,
ot just as they relate to publishing but to other kinds of job
ttributes and incentives as well. Moreover, our insights into the
istribution of the price of publishing provide a useful basis for
uture work seeking to understand more clearly how scientists
ith heterogeneous preferences sort into different employment
ectors, and, within a given sector, match with employers offer-
ng different bundles of job attributes (see Killingsworth, 1987).ch Policy 43 (2014) 32– 47 45
For example, our results suggest that ﬁrms seeking to restrict
publishing may  be able to avoid paying a wage premium if
they hire those scientists who assign little or no value to the
opportunity to publish (low end of the distribution in Figure 1).
However, our results also suggest that these scientists are unlikely
to be among the highest ability researchers, potentially offsetting
higher value appropriation via limited disclosure with lower value
creation.30
Our ﬁnding that many scientists care little about publishing sug-
gests that the use of open science policies in industry may not
necessarily reﬂect ﬁrms’ attempts to accommodate the desires of
potential employees. Rather, ﬁrms may  also adopt such policies to
realize various knowledge-related productivity beneﬁts that can
result from an interaction with the broader scientiﬁc community
(Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Stern, 2004). Our results suggests
that ﬁrms who seek to gain such productivity advantages can ben-
eﬁt from trying to attract speciﬁcally those scientists who  place a
high value on openness (high end of the distribution in Fig. 1) since
these scientists are likely to engage more actively with the scientiﬁc
community and may  also be of higher ability. One way  to attract
high ability scientists with strong preferences for publishing is to
not just allow publishing but to provide explicit publishing incen-
tives. Consistent with this idea, some science-based ﬁrms explicitly
tie publication output to ﬁnancial or promotion-related rewards
(Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Stern, 2004; Stuart and Liu, 2010).
Such publishing incentives can serve a sorting function but may
also motivate employees to exert high research effort and to actu-
ally publish their results (Lazear, 2000). Moreover, recent work by
Lacetera and Zirulia (2012) suggests that incentives for publish-
ing may  be particularly effective if scientists have strong “intrinsic”
preferences for publishing because preferences and incentives can
act as complements.
There may  also be important implications of our ﬁnding that
scientists value publishing for different reasons. For example, if a
scientist “pays” for publishing because she truly values open knowl-
edge disclosure and contributing to the advancement of science,
an employer pursuing an open science strategy may  indeed be
able to enjoy the beneﬁts of lower labor costs in the long term.
In contrast, if the scientist accepts a wage discount in return for
publishing because she expects that publications lead to higher
pay in the future, she will seek to recoup that investment at later
points. In the words of one of our respondents, “Publishing allows
you to publicly document your research success. This is GREAT for
resume building and can be used as leverage for salary negotia-
tions”. Relatedly, understanding reasons for publishing may  also
inform managers regarding what kinds of beneﬁts scientists would
most readily accept to compensate for publishing restrictions. For
example, a scientist who  values publishing primarily as a means to
advance his career may  readily forego publishing if the employer
offers attractive internal career opportunities or provides opportu-
nities to build general human capital. In contrast, a scientist who
values publishing because he has a strong desire to contribute to
the stock of public knowledge may  not see career related beneﬁts
as suitable substitutes. Thinking beyond the context of industrialskills  that meet the needs of a commercial R&D lab (Murray and Hsi, 2007).
31 There may  be interesting parallels between the price of publishing examined
in  this study and the publication fees many scientists are willing to pay to have
their  articles appear in open-access journals rather than traditional journals with
pay walls.
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he open ended responses showing that some scientists express a
trong adherence to the norm of openness and a resistance to the
ommercialization of scientiﬁc knowledge also provide support for
ans and Stern (2010), who suggest such attitudes as a potential
mpediment to the development of commercial markets for ideas.
Although our study focuses on industry employment where
hoices between publishing and pay are most salient, similar
hoices may  be important in academia as well. For example,
cademic scientists’ increasing attention toward the commer-
ialization of research outcomes has raised concerns over
ublication delays and the incomplete disclosure of research results
Blumenthal, 2003; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Rothaermel et al.,
007). Our ﬁndings regarding individual differences in the price of
ublishing as well as differences in the reasons for publishing may
rovide a useful starting point for future research on the trade-offs
esearchers are willing to make between disclosure and ﬁnancial
eturns in the particular context of academic science.
Finally, this study also speaks to a broader literature on com-
ensating differentials and the trade-offs employees make between
ay and non-pecuniary job characteristics such as social responsi-
ility (Goddeeris, 1988; Auger et al., 2011), job location (Campbell
t al., 2012), or autonomy on the job (Aghion et al., 2008; Lacetera,
009). First, our results highlight the need to consider not only
mployees’ preferences for non-pecuniary job attributes but also
hose for money. For example, relatively large observed wage dis-
ounts in “socially responsible” ﬁrms may  not only reﬂect that
ertain employees care strongly about social responsibility, but also
hat they care little about money. Second, it seems important to gain
 deeper understanding of the reasons why individuals value cer-
ain nonpecuniary job attributes. For example, Aghion et al.’s (2008)
odel focuses on scientists’ desire for freedom as such and posits
hat organizations that restrict freedom have to pay higher wages.
e suspect that some individuals may  derive utility from freedom
tself (Deci and Ryan, 1985), while others may  value freedom for
ts indirect beneﬁts, e.g., because it allows them to work on prob-
ems that they ﬁnd interesting or because it allows them to focus
n building valuable human capital and reputation in a particular
omain. Different reasons, in turn, may  predict how much employ-
rs have to pay to limit researcher freedom and how researchers
se the freedom they are given.
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